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Denmark
Ribot’s (1896) long standing definition of anhedonia as “the inability to experience
pleasure” has been challenged recently following progress in affective neuroscience.
In particular, accumulating evidence suggests that reward consists of multiple
subcomponents of wanting, liking and learning, as initially outlined by Berridge and
Robinson (2003), and these processes have been proposed to relate to appetitive,
consummatory and satiety phases of a pleasure cycle. Building on this work, we
recently proposed to reconceptualize anhedonia as “impairments in the ability to pursue,
experience, and/or learn about pleasure, which is often, but not always accessible
to conscious awareness.” (Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015). This framework is in line
with Treadway and Zald’s (2011) proposal to differentiate between motivational and
consummatory types of anhedonia, and stresses the need to combine traditional self-
report measures with behavioral measures or procedures. In time, this approach may
lead to improved clinical assessment and treatment. In line with our reconceptualization,
increasing evidence suggests that reward processing deficits are not restricted to
impaired hedonic impact in major psychiatric disorders. Successful translations of
animal models have led to strong evidence of impairments in the ability to pursue
and learn about reward in psychiatric disorders such as major depressive disorder,
schizophrenia, and addiction. It is of high importance that we continue to systematically
target impairments in all phases of reward processing across disorders using behavioral
testing in combination with neuroimaging techniques. This in turn has implications for
diagnosis and treatment, and is essential for the purposes of identifying the underlying
neurobiological mechanisms. Here I review recent progress in the development and
application of behavioral procedures that measure subcomponents of anhedonia across
relevant patient groups, and discuss methodological caveats as well as implications for
assessment and treatment.
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Introduction
The generally accepted understanding of the term anhedonia has remained almost unaltered since
Ribot (1896) first defined it as the “inability to experience pleasure” over a century ago. However,
during the last 5 years the term has been subject to debate and some progress has been made
in terms of elucidating the underlying neurobiological mechanisms. A number of recent reviews
(Treadway and Zald, 2011; Der-Avakian and Markou, 2012; Whitton et al., 2015), summarize
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this progress and offer improved understanding of the underlying
neurobiology. However, their conceptual understanding of
anhedonia diverge. Treadway and Zald (2011) made a convincing
case to differentiate between motivational and consummatory
types of anhedonia and introduced the term decisional anhedonia
to emphasize the influence of anhedonic symptoms on decision-
making. In contrast, Der-Avakian and Markou (2012) recently
argued that deficits in motivational and decision-making
processes (albeit disturbed, e.g., in depressed patients) should not
be labeled under the umbrella of anhedonia.
Overall, findings from affective neuroscience have challenged
Ribot’s (1896) definition, which is restricted to subjectively
experienced pleasure. Accumulating evidence suggests that
reward consists of multiple subcomponents and processes of
wanting, liking and learning (Robinson and Berridge, 2003;
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008) and these processes have been
proposed to relate to appetitive, consummatory and satiety
phases of a pleasure cycle (Kringelbach et al., 2012). Building on
this work, we recently proposed to reconceptualize anhedonia
as “impaired ability to pursue, experience and/or learn about
pleasure, which is often, but not always accessible to conscious
awareness” (Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015, p. 2).
The parsing of reward into wanting, liking and learning
components was originally introduced by Robinson and Berridge
(1993) in their influential incentive sensitization theory of drug
addiction. The theory has received support in animal and human
studies of drug addiction (Vezina and Leyton, 2009; Leyton
and Vezina, 2013) and recently also in terms of behavioral
addiction like Gambling Disorder (Leyton and Vezina, 2012;
Rømer Thomsen et al., 2014). In Robinson and Berridge’s
taxonomy they differentiate between core reactions that are not
necessarily conscious (“wanting,” “liking,” and “learning”) and
their conscious counterparts (wanting, liking, and learning, i.e.,
denoted without quotation marks; Berridge and Robinson, 2003;
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008). In other words, reward can
be parsed into three main components—motivation, hedonic
impact and learning—and each of these components consist of
both conscious and unconscious subcomponents (see Figure 1A).
For example, motivation consists of “(1) core incentive salience
“wanting” processes that are not necessarily conscious (e.g., cue-
triggered “wanting” for food or drugs) and (2) conscious desires
for incentives or cognitive goals” (Berridge andKringelbach, 2008,
p. 2). Hedonic impact consists of “(1) core “liking” reactions that
need not necessarily be conscious and (2) conscious experiences
of pleasure, in the ordinary sense of the word, which may be
elaborated out of core “liking” reactions by brain mechanisms
of awareness” (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008, p. 2). Similarly,
learning (or learned predictions) include “(1) implicit knowledge
as well as associative conditioning, such as basic pavlovian
and instrumental associations and (2) explicit and cognitive
predictions” (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008, p. 2).
The subcomponents of reward constantly interact through the
appetitive, consummatory and satiety phases of a pleasure cycle,
but can be teased apart using systematic scientific analysis. Self-
report measures can help identify the conscious components
(wanting, liking, and learning) and provide valuable information
on this level of processing. However, self-report measures are of
course limited in their ability to capture unconscious processes,
as well as in their ability to parse out contributions that may have
been made by any of the unconscious processes, considering that
these processes interact strongly together. In contrast, behavioral
procedures from animal studies provide useful markers of the
core “wanting,” “liking,” and “learning” reactions (Figure 1B).
For example, “liking” reactions have been studied in rodents by
measuring the affective orofacial expressions that are elicited in
response to sweet tastes (Pfaffmann et al., 1977; Grill andNorgren,
1978a,b), and a number of procedures have been developed to
study “wanting” in rodents, e.g., by measuring the effort exerted
to obtain rewards (Salamone et al., 2007) or the ability of reward-
related cues to act as motivational magnets (Wyvell and Berridge,
2000). In recent years, some of these animal models have been
successfully translated to human studies and provide valuable
behavioral measures of subcomponents of reward, which can
complement traditional self-report measures (Figure 1C).
Overall, findings from animal and human studies applying
these types of measures support the view that reward is a
complex process consisting of several psychological components
that correspond to partly dissociable neurobiological mechanisms
(Berridge and Robinson, 2003; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008,
2015). For example, there is strong evidence that dopamine plays
an important role in “wanting,” but not in “liking” reactions. In
animal and human studies where “wanting” and “liking” reactions
have been systematically teased apart, specific manipulation of
dopamine signaling has failed to shift “liking” reactions to rewards
(Berridge and Valenstein, 1991; Peciña et al., 2003; Ward et al.,
2012). In contrast, there is accumulating evidence that dopamine
plays an important role in “wanting” processes. For example,
elevation of dopamine has been shown to increase willingness
to work for a food reward in rodents (Bardgett et al., 2009),
while dopamine attenuation or blockade has the opposite effect
(Cousins and Salamone, 1994; Salamone et al., 2007). Similarly,
evidence from human studies suggests that amphetamine/L-
Dopa-induced elevated dopamine increases subjective ratings of
drug wanting, but not subjective ratings of drug liking during
consumption (Leyton et al., 2002, 2007; Liggins et al., 2012).
Recently, Wardle et al. (2011) provided evidence that elevated
levels of dopamine increase willingness to work for reward in
humans using a behavioral measure.
Building on the framework set forward by Berridge
and Robinson (2003) suggesting that reward consists of
multiple subcomponents of wanting, liking, and learning
and recent proposals relating these processes to the appetitive,
consummatory and satiety phases of a pleasure cycle (Kringelbach
et al., 2012), we recently proposed to reconceptualize anhedonia
as “impairments in the ability to pursue, experience and/or
learn about pleasure” (Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015, p. 2). In
this conceptualization of anhedonia, impairments in each of
the subcomponents can lead to a malfunctioning pleasure
system. Normally, wanting, liking, and learning processes are
balanced over time, however this balance can be compromised by
impairments in each of the components. Depending on which of
the subcomponents are most affected, and how the components
are affected, this can lead to distinct subtypes of anhedonia, that
are associated with distinct imbalances of the pleasure system
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FIGURE 1 | Measuring anhedonia. (A) Anhedonia is linked to problems with the complex and multifaceted psychological processes involved in reward processing.
These include explicit processes of wanting, liking, and learning that are consciously perceived, and their implicit counterparts (denoted with quotation marks in the
text) that are potentially unconscious, i.e., they can operate at a level not always accessible to conscious awareness. These components constantly interact and
require careful scientific analysis to tease apart. Animal studies have provided measurements or behavioral procedures that are especially sensitive markers of each of
the potentially unconscious processes (“wanting,” “liking,” and “learning”). Recently, some of these procedures have been successfully translated to human studies,
thereby providing more objective behavioral measures to aid subjective self-report measures. In particular, recent developments of behavioral measures of “wanting”
and “learning” are promising, while bias-free measures of “liking” reactions in humans have proven more difficult. (B,C) Examples of how a measure of “wanting” has
been successfully translated from animal to human studies. (B) In animal studies, “wanting” can be measured by looking at how willing the animal is to exert effort in
exchange for more palatable food rewards, for example by using a choice paradigm devised to look at effort-based decision-making (Salamone et al., 1994). (C) In
human studies, “wanting” can be measured similarly, by looking at how much a participant is willing to work for a reward, for example by combining salient stimuli
with key-press/force-grip procedures. The first study of this kind used key-presses to operationalize “wanting” as the effort participants exerted to increase or
decrease viewing time of images of salient faces on a screen (Aharon et al., 2001). OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial
prefrontal cortex; NAc, nucleus accumbens; PAG, periaqueductal gray; VP, ventral pallidum; VTA, ventral tegmental area; ACh, Acetylcholine; PIT, pavlovian
instrumental transfer; EEfRT, effort expenditure for rewards task. Figure and figure legend modified and reprinted with permission from Frontiers in Behavioral
Neuroscience (Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015).
(Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015). For example, patients suffering
from major depressive disorder often describe a diminished
ability to pursue and experience pleasure, i.e., a progressive
decrease in some (or all) of the reward components. In contrast,
drug addiction can be characterized by excessive wanting for
the drug of choice, which grows over time independently of
drug liking. While anhedonia has traditionally been conceived
as diminished responses (typically, diminished subjectively
experienced pleasure), “our proposed framework acknowledges
that both too much and too little activity in specific parts of
the pleasure system can lead to pathological changes. This is for
example illustrated in the excessive wanting for drugs in drug
addiction or in disorders with hypersexuality” (Rømer Thomsen
et al., 2015, p. 15).
It is important to note, that in this terminology (Rømer
Thomsen et al., 2015) pleasure and pleasure system is not restricted
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to hedonic impact, but is instead used to encompass all of the
phases of reward processing. This is in contrast to the dominating
terminology, where pleasure is restricted to the hedonic impact
of a reward, while reward is used to encompass all of the reward-
related processes (see, e.g., Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008). In an
attempt to avoid misunderstandings, I have changed the wording
of our definition in the present paper to reflect the dominating
terminology. Hence, anhedonia is defined here as “impairments
in the ability to pursue, experience, and/or learn about reward.”
In line with our proposed reconceptualization of anhedonia,
there has been a growing bulk of evidence suggesting that reward
processing deficits are not restricted to impaired hedonic impact
in psychiatric disorders typically associated with anhedonia.
Findings from the past 5 years suggest that motivational and
learning processes are impaired, e.g., in patients suffering from
major depressive disorder (subsequently referred to as depression)
and schizophrenia (Treadway and Zald, 2011; Fervaha et al.,
2013b; Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015; Whitton et al., 2015). Part
of this work is based on successful translations of animal models,
thereby paving the way for validated behavioral paradigms that
can supplement traditional self-report measures. These efforts
are exciting and hold promise in terms of elucidating the role of
subcomponents of anhedonia and the underlying neurobiological
mechanisms across major psychiatric disorders. Here I review
recent progress in the development and application of behavioral
procedures thatmeasure subcomponents of anhedonia in relevant
patient groups (including patients suffering from depression,
schizophrenia and addiction) and discuss implications for clinical
assessment and treatment.
Measuring Subcomponents of Anhedonia
In line with the generally accepted understanding of anhedonia as
“decreased subjective experience of pleasure” [as per Ribot’s
(1896) definition], the most popular way of measuring
anhedonia has been self-report scales or questionnaires like
The Fawcett–Clark Pleasure Scale (FCPS; Fawcett et al., 1983) or
The Snaith–Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS; Snaith et al., 1995).
The majority of these instruments are restricted to measuring
subjective experiences of hedonic impact (i.e., liking), but some
of the more recently developed questionnaires also include
aspects of reward motivation (i.e., wanting). For example, The
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS; Gard et al.,
2006) differentiates between anticipatory and consummatory
experiences of pleasure, and The Sensitivity To Reinforcement
of Addictive and other Primary Rewards (STRAP-R; Goldstein
et al., 2010) measures liking and wanting of drug and non-drug
rewards under various situations (e.g., current and hypothetical).
Building on Robinson and Berridge’s incentive sensitization
theory (Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Robinson et al., 2013),
Lende (2005) developed a short Incentive Salience Scale that
measures key aspects of drug wanting and has been used to
predict addiction status.
While these instruments provide useful information about the
conscious components of anhedonia, they are of course limited
in their ability to capture unconscious components. Similar to
research on reward (Berridge and Robinson, 2003; Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2008), it is crucial to differentiate between conscious
and unconscious components of anhedonia (Rømer Thomsen
et al., 2015). Accumulating evidence suggests that we do not
always know what motivates our behavior or brings us pleasure
(Aharon et al., 2001; Winkielman et al., 2005; Moeller et al., 2009;
Parsons et al., 2011), and there is convincing evidence that reward
(also) affects our behavior on an unconscious level (Winkielman
et al., 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2007, 2008; Aarts et al., 2008).
During the last 5 years a number of validated and useful
behavioral procedures have been developed that can be used to
measure impairments in the described subcomponents of reward
(Figure 1). Of particular relevance are recent developments in
behavioral procedures that can be used to measure impairments
in the ability to pursue and learn about reward.
Impaired Ability to Pursue Reward
A large number of animal models have been developed to
study motivational processes by looking at behavior related to
obtainment of rewards such as food. Of particular relevance
here are models of the effort exerted to obtain rewards [e.g.,
by measuring how eagerly the animal runs for rewards in a
runway (Berridge and Valenstein, 1991; Peciña et al., 2003) or
its willingness to exert effort in exchange for more palatable food
rewards (Salamone et al., 1994, 2007)] and of the ability of reward-
related cues to act as motivational magnets [e.g., by measuring
pavlovian instrumental transfer (Wyvell and Berridge, 2000,
2001)]. Recently, some of these models have been successfully
translated to studies of humans and the reported findings offer
intriguing information on the role of reward motivation across
major psychiatric disorders.
The effort expenditure for rewards task (EEfRT), which was
developed by Treadway et al. (2009), represent a good example
of how a validated animal model of motivation (Salamone et al.,
1994) can be successfully translated to human studies. The EEfRT
is an effort-based decision-making task, where reduced reward
motivation is operationalized as a decreased willingness to choose
greater-effort/greater-reward over less-effort/less-reward options
with varying probability (Treadway et al., 2009). Recently, the
task has been applied to relevant clinical populations and provide
evidence of reduced willingness to expend effort for rewards in
patients with subsyndromal depression, first-episode depression
and remitted depression, compared to controls (Treadway et al.,
2012; Yang et al., 2014).
A recent longitudinal study of reward seeking behavior in
individuals at risk of depression provides intriguing evidence
of diminished reward motivation as a potential precursor of
depression (Rawal et al., 2013). Adolescent offspring of depressed
parents performed the Cambridge Gambling Task in order to
measure betting behavior under different odds. Compared to
healthy adolescents and adolescents with externalizing disorders,
the adolescent offspring of depressed parents showed diminished
reward seeking (i.e., betted less at favorable odds). Importantly,
the magnitude of this diminished response predicted depressive
symptoms, depression-onset and functional impairment 1 year
later (Rawal et al., 2013).
Several recent studies have reported decreased willingness to
work for rewards using the EEfRT or similar tasks in patients
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suffering from schizophrenia (Fervaha et al., 2013c; Gold et al.,
2013; Barch et al., 2014). For example, Barch et al. (2014) reported
that patients with schizophrenia were less willing to work harder
when the size of the rewards increased or when the rewards were
more probable, compared to control participants. Furthermore,
among patients with schizophrenia, there was an association
between choosing fewer greater-effort/greater-reward choices
in the task and having more severe negative symptoms (self-
reported) and worse community and work function (reported by
caretaker; Barch et al., 2014).
Overall these findings are exciting and promising by providing
strong evidence of reduced reward motivation across major
psychiatric disorders. However, as we have previously stressed
(Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015) participants are working for
abstract rewards in these tasks, and not fundamental rewards
(as in the animal models). Whether abstract and fundamental
rewards are treated in the sameway remains an open question, but
emerging evidence suggests that there are important differences in
the underlying brain processing (Sescousse et al., 2013a,b).
Other groups have used a relatedmeasure of rewardmotivation
in humans by combining a key-pressing procedure with salient
face stimuli (Aharon et al., 2001; Parsons et al., 2011). In
these tasks, “wanting” is operationalized as the amount of work
participants perform (i.e., by pressing a key) in order to change
the duration they view images of adult/infant faces on a screen.
Findings from these studies provide support for a dissociation of
conscious liking ratings of salient face stimuli and the behavioral
measure of “wanting” (Aharon et al., 2001; Parsons et al., 2011).
For example, heterosexual males used more effort to keep female
compared to male faces on a screen, but in a self-report task they
rated the faces as equally attractive (Aharon et al., 2001). The use of
salient face stimuli in combination with a key-pressing procedure
represents a promising way to study possible impairments in the
ability (or willingness) to work for fundamental social rewards in
humans.
Moeller et al. (2009) have used a similar key-pressing paradigm
in combination with salient drug-related stimuli and provide
evidence for increased “wanting” of drug-related stimuli in drug
addicted: cocaine addicted used more effort to view cocaine-
related stimuli in a behavioral choice task, compared to control
participants. Furthermore, they reported dissociation between a
self-report measure of hedonic impact and a behavioral measure
of motivation in cocaine addicted individuals: in the self-report
task they rated pictures of pleasant scenes as more pleasant
than cocaine-related pictures, however, in the behavioral choice
task they did not show this preference (Moeller et al., 2009).
These findings are in line with the incentive sensitization theory
(Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Robinson et al., 2013) which
argues that cue-triggered “wanting” of drug-related stimuli is
enhanced in drug addicted individuals, and that these “wanting”
processes are partly dissociable from “liking” processes in the
brain, and in behavior. The reported dissociation between self-
reported hedonic impact and a behavioral measure of motivation
also reflects the impaired insight that characterizes drug addicted
individuals (Goldstein et al., 2009; Moeller and Goldstein, 2014).
A related and promising measure of effort is the use of force-
grip procedures which allows us to quantify various aspects of
effort including; how much effort is exerted over time, how fast
participants start to squeeze, or how fast the force is increased
(Aarts et al., 2008). By combining force-grip procedures with
subliminal priming paradigms it becomes possible to study
motivational processes that we are not aware of (Pessiglione et al.,
2007; Aarts et al., 2008). For example, it has been shown that
subliminally priming of the concept of exertion (i.e., words such
as “exert” or “vigorous”) can prepare people for forceful action,
andwhen primes are accompaniedwith a rewarding stimulus (i.e.,
a consciously visible positive word) they are motivated to spend
more effort (Aarts et al., 2008). In a similar set-up, Pessiglione et al.
(2007) studied unconscious motivation with an Incentive Force
Task, where the amount and reportability of monetary rewards
participants could gain through physical effort varied. Pessiglione
et al. (2007) reported that even when participants were unable
to report how much money was at stake, they still used more
effort for larger rewards. These paradigms have yet to be applied
to samples of relevant patients, but they represent a promising way
to investigate impairments in unconscious reward motivation.
Another important component of reward motivation is the
ability of reward-related cues to capture our attention and
act as motivational magnets. In human studies, one way of
operationalizing the ability of certain stimuli to capture our
attention is by using variants of the attentional blink paradigm.
Studies using this type of measure provide evidence that drug
addicted individuals display an attentional bias toward drug-
related visual cues and that this bias is correlated with self-
reported craving (Wiers and Stacy, 2006; Field et al., 2009; Tibboel
et al., 2010). For example, heavy social drinkers have reduced
attentional blink for alcohol-related stimuli, which is consistent
with the hypothesis of enhanced attentional bias for salient drug-
related cues (Tibboel et al., 2010). Recent evidence suggests
that a similar mechanism is present in behavioral addiction like
Gambling Disorder (Brevers et al., 2011a,b; Rømer Thomsen
et al., 2014). For example, in an attentional blink paradigm
problem gamblers exhibited enhanced processing of gambling-
related cues compared to neutral cues (Brevers et al., 2011b),
and in a change detection task problem gamblers were faster at
detecting gambling-related stimulus changes compared to neutral
(Brevers et al., 2011a). Taken together, these findings support the
hypothesis of an attentional bias toward addiction-related stimuli
in drug and behavioral addiction.
Impaired Ability to Learn About Reward
There is an extensive literature from animal and human studies
investigating the ability to learn from experiences with reward and
punishment. Recently, some of these paradigms have been applied
to relevant patient groups and provide evidence of impairments
in the ability to learn about reward in patients suffering from
depression and schizophrenia.
In a series of studies, Pizzagalli and colleagues have investigated
impairments in the ability, or propensity, to develop a response
bias toward stimuli that are more frequently rewarded than
others using a probabilistic reward task (Pizzagalli et al., 2005,
2008; Pechtel et al., 2013; Vrieze et al., 2013). The task has
been applied to patients with varying degree of depressive and
anhedonia symptoms and findings from these studies consistently
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show evidence of impaired reward learning. In the first study,
Pizzagalli et al. (2005) showed that in participants with low levels
of depressive symptoms there was an increase in the response bias
over time, whichwas not present in participants with high levels of
depressive symptoms. Subsequent studies of clinical populations
show evidence of diminished reward responsiveness in depressed
patients compared with controls (Pizzagalli et al., 2008; Vrieze
et al., 2013), in patients with remitted depression compared with
controls (Pechtel et al., 2013), and in depressed patients with high
vs. low levels of anhedonia symptoms (Vrieze et al., 2013).
Of relevance here are also studies using probabilistic learning
tasks that differentiate between reward-guided and punishment-
guided learning. So far, this type of paradigm has not been
systematically applied to clinically depressed patients, but one
study reported evidence of blunted reward- and punishment-
guided learning in depressed patients compared with controls
(Chase et al., 2010). More data is available from patients suffering
from schizophrenia. Compared to controls, patients suffering
from schizophrenia consistently show deficits in reward-guided
learning, while findings regarding punishment-guided learning
are conflicting (Waltz et al., 2007, 2011; Strauss et al., 2011; Gold
et al., 2012; Yilmaz et al., 2012; Fervaha et al., 2013a).
Studies targeting impairments in unconscious reward learning
are intriguing, considering recent evidence of reward learning
occurring outside our awareness. Pessiglione et al. (2008) used a
subliminal instrumental conditioning task, where cues predicting
monetary reward or punishment are subliminally presented, and
showed that participants develop a propensity to choose cues
associated with reward, even though the cues are not consciously
perceived. These findings support the notion that cues related
to reward and punishment (also) affect behavior and decision-
making processes on an unconscious level and underscores the
need to study reward processing deficits on both conscious and
unconscious levels. This type of paradigm has yet to be applied
to relevant patients, but represents a promising method to study
potential impairments in unconscious reinforcement learning.
In animal studies, the conditioned place preference (CPP)
procedure has long been used to study the development of
preferences for environments or stimuli which have previously
been associated with rewarding drug intake through the process
of classical conditioning (Tzschentke, 1998, 2007). Recently,
Mayo et al. (2013) successfully translated the CPP procedure
into a human drug conditioning task and showed that healthy
participants develop a behavioral preference for cues that have
been paired with drug intake (a dose of methamphetamine),
compared with cues that have been paired with placebo. These
findings were recently replicated and extended by including a
broader range of measures of the conditioned drug response,
including self-report, behavioral and psychophysiological
measures. After the conditioning procedure, participants showed
an increase in behavioral preference, positive emotional reactivity,
and attentional bias toward the cue associated with drug intake,
compared with the cue associated with placebo (Mayo and deWit,
2015). This paradigm represents a promising method to study
individual determinants of classical conditioning and is therefore
highly relevant for the disorders discussed here. For example,
this type of paradigm can shed light on individual risk factors in
the development of sensitized responses to drugs/drug-related
cues and blunted responses to other types of rewards (e.g.,
social, sexual, and sensory) in drug addiction, and similarly in
behavioral addiction such as Gambling Disorder. This procedure
is also highly promising in terms of studying deficient associative
learning in patients suffering from depression and schizophrenia,
preferably by using different types of rewards.
In line with the strong evidence suggesting that “wanting,”
“liking,” and “learning” processes are dissociable in the brain and
in behavior, it is important to note that the impaired reward
learning reviewed here is not necessarily related to impairments
in the ability to learn about “liking” (i.e., the hedonic impact of
a reward), but could as easily be due to a reduced or modified
sensitivity to the rewarding properties of the stimulus in the
absence of “liking.” Future studies are needed to tease these
differences apart.
Impaired Ability to Experience Pleasure
While successful models have been developed to study aspects of
reward motivation and reward learning in humans, it has proven
more difficult to develop behavioral procedures that measure
hedonic impact in humans. In animal studies, hedonic impact of
pleasurable stimuli has been successfully studied by measuring
affective orofacial expressions elicited by the hedonic impact
of sweet tastes. Studies applying taste-reactivity paradigms have
convincingly shown that sweet tastes elicit rhythmic licking of lips
(i.e., facial “liking” reactions) and bitter tastes elicit gapes (i.e.,
facial “disliking” reactions) in rodents and human infants (Steiner,
1973, 1974; Pfaffmann et al., 1977; Grill and Norgren, 1978a,b;
Steiner et al., 2001). However, these affective orofacial measures
are not easily translated to (adult) human studies, becausewe learn
to control and mimic orofacial reactions to food as we grow up.
The hedonic impact of other types of rewards (than food)
appears to be easier to measure behaviorally, or physiologically.
Although mostly taboo, there is an increasing interest in
the mechanisms underlying sexual pleasures (Georgiadis and
Kringelbach, 2012; Georgiadis et al., 2012), and a number
of measures have been developed to quantify pleasure-elicited
“liking” reactions to sexual pleasures, e.g., by measuring rectal
pressure variability and self-reported level of sexual arousal
(Georgiadis et al., 2006). Although impairments related to sexual
activity and sexual pleasures are still taboo, they represent a
promising area of research that can help shed light on impairments
in hedonic impact in relevant patient groups, including patients
suffering from depression, schizophrenia and addiction.
A number of studies have measured facial reactions to pictures
of emotional facial expressions and there is some evidence of
a blunted response to positive facial expressions in depressed
patients (Bylsma et al., 2008). For example, Dimberg (1982, 1990)
has used electromyographic (EMG) recordings to detect emotion-
related facial movements and shown that we elicit distinct facial
reactions in response to emotional facial expressions, which partly
reflects a tendency to mimic the facial expression. Studies have
shown that these reactions are elicited very rapidly (Dimberg and
Thunberg, 1998) and even when participants are not aware that
they are being exposed to facial stimuli (Dimberg et al., 2000).
Although it is unlikely that all changes in facial musculature
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are related to emotion, EMG recordings of facial reactions may
provide a way to investigate deficits in “liking” reactions to
social pleasure (e.g., happy facial expressions). These rapid facial
reactions have already been related to empathy (Dimberg et al.,
2011), however more work is needed to confirm that they are in
fact indicators of pleasure “liking.”
So far, the most popular way of measuring hedonic impact
in humans has been to measure self-reported hedonic reactivity
(i.e., subjective ratings of pleasure) to pleasant solutions and
odors in a here-and-now setting. Surprisingly, the majority of
studies report similar, or higher, pleasantness ratings in depressed
patients compared to controls in response to sweet solutions
(Amsterdam et al., 1987; Berlin et al., 1998; Scinska et al., 2004;
Swiecicki et al., 2009; Dichter et al., 2010) and various odors
(Steiner et al., 1993; Pause et al., 2001; Lombion-Pouthier et al.,
2006; Scinska et al., 2008; Clepce et al., 2010). Similarly, evidence
from studies of patients suffering from schizophrenia does not
suggest that this patient group experiences lower levels of hedonic
reactivity to pleasurable stimuli compared with controls (Heerey
and Gold, 2007; Barch and Dowd, 2010; Strauss and Gold, 2012).
Interestingly, the same patient groups (depressed and
schizophrenic) report diminished enjoyment in studies where
they are asked to rate prospective, retrospective, or hypothetical
experiences (McFarland and Klein, 2009; Watson and Naragon-
Gainey, 2010; Strauss and Gold, 2012). One way of interpreting
this discrepancy is that anhedonic patients retain core “liking”
reactions, but do not cognitively value them in the same way as
they did before (Dichter et al., 2010; Berridge and Kringelbach,
2011). This interpretation should however, be seen in the light
of standard clinical examinations where depressed patients
often present with behavioral characteristics that do not only
imply impairments in cognitive evaluations of their experiences.
For example, clinicians often report less smiling and less
reactivity to stimuli (in general) which might reflect diminished
“liking.” The disagreement—between laboratory based studies
using taste-reactivity paradigms and clinical observations of
patients—underscores the need to consider methodological
aspects. The laboratory based studies reviewed here (where
they failed to show diminished “liking” reactions to pleasurable
solutions and odors in depressed and schizophrenic patients)
were all based on self-reported ratings of hedonic impact. It
remains an open question whether behavioral or physiological
measures of “liking” will inform us differently.
Implications for Assessment and
Treatment
The generally accepted understanding of anhedonia as
“diminished subjectively experienced pleasure” is reflected
in current diagnostic classification systems. For example, in the
DSM 5 anhedonia is one of two main symptoms needed for the
diagnosis of depression and is defined as “decreased interest and
pleasure in most activities most of the day” (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). In this definition of anhedonia, wanting
and liking components are collapsed, which is in contrast to the
accumulating evidence suggesting that these processes are in fact
dissociable in the brain and in behavior. For example, findings
from animal and human studies suggest that dopamine plays
a crucial role in reward motivation (“wanting” and wanting),
but not in hedonic impact (“liking” and liking; Berridge and
Robinson, 2003; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008).
Further, findings from affective neuroscience suggest that
reward processing deficits are not restricted to impaired hedonic
impact. As reviewed here, increasing evidence suggests that
the ability to pursue and learn about reward is compromised
in patients suffering from depression, schizophrenia, and
drug/behavioral addiction (Treadway and Zald, 2011; Rømer
Thomsen et al., 2015; Whitton et al., 2015). In contrast, it is less
clear whether core “liking” reactions are in fact compromised in,
e.g., depression and schizophrenia.
The growing evidence that reward processing deficits are not
restricted to diminished experience of pleasure across major
psychiatric disorders stresses the need to consider impairments
in reward wanting and reward learning in clinical assessments. As
a start, self-report instruments could be elaborated to reflect all
phases of reward processing. The motivational aspect has already
been included in some of the more recent questionnaires (e.g., the
TEPS and the STRAP-R), but so far the learning component has
been absent. Considering the growing evidence that unconscious
components of reward affect our behavior, and are not always
accompanied by conscious awareness (Berridge andWinkielman,
2003; Pessiglione et al., 2007, 2008; Aarts et al., 2008), it is
highly debatable whether self-report instruments are sufficient in
clinical assessments. Or whether they should be complemented
by behavioral procedures. For example, behavioral measures of
“wanting” could compliment self-report questionnaires in clinical
assessments with advantage and help guide subsequent treatment.
Depending on which subcomponents of reward processing are
mainly affected, different medical treatments may be afforded.
For example, depressed patients characterized by impaired
ability to pursue pleasurable activities may benefit from medical
interventions that target neurotransmitter systems such as the
mesolimbic dopamine system and the opioid system, which have
been shown to play a crucial role in reward motivation (Treadway
and Zald, 2011; Soskin et al., 2013; Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015).
These insights are also relevant in terms of psychological
treatment options. For example, cognitive behavioral therapy
(CBT) has so far shown more promising treatment effects than
pharmacological treatments in patients suffering from drug and
behavioral addiction (Gooding and Tarrier, 2009; Potenza et al.,
2011; Bullock andPotenza, 2012). In the context of addiction, CBT
is expected to improve the individual’s control over motivation by
increasing awareness of cues that trigger craving and by learning
skills that enable new patterns of thinking and acting (Potenza
et al., 2011). These efforts are important and efficiently target
conscious feelings of craving. However, this type of cognitive
intervention has limited efficacy in terms of targeting unconscious
mechanisms. In particular, cue-induced craving reactions that
occur outside our awareness are not likely to be targeted in CBT,
but play an important role in maintaining the addictive behavior
as outlined, e.g., by the incentive sensitization theory of addiction
(Robinson et al., 2013). Hence, although CBT reduces some of the
cognitive layers of responsiveness to drug cues, it is very likely that
unconscious layers persist (Robinson et al., 2013).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 14097
Rømer Thomsen Measuring anhedonia
Other types of psychological interventions may provide a way
to target unconscious “wanting” (or “craving”) mechanisms, such
as mindfulness based interventions that aim to improve the
individual’s awareness of bodily and emotional signals (Garland
et al., 2014). There is some evidence to suggest that mindfulness
based interventions can reduce consumption and craving of
a number of substances in substance users, although more
randomized controlled trials are warranted (Chiesa and Serretti,
2014). For example, in a recent randomized controlled trial Tang
et al. (2013) reported that brief meditation training reduced
smoking by 60% in smokers who wanted to quit smoking, which
was accompanied by increased activity in brain regions related
to self-control and self-awareness. These findings foster hope
that mindfulness based interventions can improve self-control
and awareness of otherwise unconscious “wanting” reactions,
and stresses the need to consider these types of treatments in
combination with CBT, although more randomized controlled
studies are warranted.
Concluding Remarks
Ribot’s (1896) long standing definition of anhedonia as “the
inability to experience pleasure” has been challenged following
progress in affective neuroscience, and in particular following
pioneering work suggesting that reward consists of multiple
subcomponents that can be divided into the processes of wanting,
liking and learning (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008). Recent
proposals to reconceptualize anhedonia as motivational or
consummatory subtypes of anhedonia (Treadway andZald, 2011),
or as impaired ability to pursue, experience, and/or learn about
pleasure (Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015) have paved the way for
objective behavioral measures to complement traditional self-
report measures of anhedonia. As reviewed here, a number of
behavioral procedures have been developed that can be used
to measure impairments in reward motivation and reward
learning, while behavioral measures of hedonic impact have
proven more difficult. Findings from studies applying these
methods support the new conceptualizations of anhedonia by
providing robust evidence that reward processing deficits are
not restricted to impaired hedonic impact in major psychiatric
disorders. Instead, there is increasing evidence of impairments in
the ability to pursue and learn about reward in, e.g., depression
and schizophrenia. This progress is essential for the purposes
of identifying the underlying neurobiological mechanisms
of anhedonia, and has important clinical implications for
assessment and treatment of anhedonia. For example, self-
report measures of anhedonia could be elaborated to reflect all
phases of reward processing and it is debatable whether self-
report measures of anhedonia are sufficient, or whether they
should be complemented by behavioral measures in clinical
assessments.
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